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Abstract 
How effective is compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in identifying and eliminating 
firm threats from information systems breaches?  We investigated publicly reported security 
breaches of internal controls in corporate systems to determine whether SOX assessments are 
information bearing with respect to breaches which can lead to materially significant losses and 
misstatements.   The results of our tests varied significantly between breach types.  SOX Section 
404 adverse decisions on effectiveness of controls occurred in 100% of credit card data breaches 
and around 33% of insider breaches.  SOX 404 audits provided a contrarian “effective” control 
decisions on 88% of situations where there was a control breach concerning a portable device.  
This suggests that employees are subverting particularly strict internal controls by using portable 
devices that can be carried outside the physical boundaries of the firm.  We found that management 
and SOX 404 auditors do not general agree on the underlying internal control situation at any time; 
instead the SOX 404 team was likely to discover material weaknesses and “educate” management 
and internal audit teams about the importance of these control weaknesses.  SOX attestations were 
poor at identifying control weaknesses from unintended disclosures, physical losses, hacking and 
malware, stationary devices, and situations where the cause of the breach was unknown.  Hazard 
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and occupancy structural models were constructed to extrapolate to a larger population; results 
showed that both SOX 302 and 404 section audits provided information germane to the frequency 
of breaches, with SOX 404 being three times as informative as section 302 reports.  The hazard 
model found an expected 2.88% reduction in breaches when SOX 302 controls are effective; 
management “material weakness’ attestations provided no information in this structural model, 
whereas there would be around a 1% increase in breach occurrence when there are significant 
deficiencies. SOX 404 attestations were the most informative, and a negative SOX 404 attestation 
is projected to increase the frequency of breaches by around 8.5%.  We concluded that the strength 
of internal controls attested in SOX reports is likely to be a significant factor in the occurrence of a 
breach at a firm in a specific period.   (349 words) 
 
 
1.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Threat to the Firm’s Systems 
Following the Enron and WorldCom collapses that marked the end of the dot-com bubble, U.S. 
legislators sought to better protect and inform investors through passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 (“SOX”). Section 404 of SOX (“SOX 404”) requires companies to review under the 
supervision of external auditors their internal controls over financial reporting (“ICFRs”) and 
declare whether their ICFRs are “effective” or “ineffective.”  Section 302 of SOX (“SOX 302”) 
requires companies to self-report on effectiveness of internal controls.   One significant reason for 
the focus on internal control is the potential for firms to suffer systems intrusion from external 
actors, commonly referred to as security breaches or hacks, which can lead to materially significant 
losses and misstatements.  
Recent information systems breaches have grown costlier and more frequent; for example, Home 
Depot’s 2015 breach has cost it $232 million so far, an amount that they expect to reach billions. A 
2015 breach of Ashley Madison stole 40 million accounts including photos, details of sexual 
proclivities and personal addresses, Target’s 2013 breach affected the accounts of 70 million 
customers and so far, has cost the firm $162 million in added expense.  In 2014 A "Guardians of 
Peace" breach of Sony Pictures stole over 100 terabytes of confidential data. 2014 also saw the 
theft of 360 million MySpace accounts, a LinkedIn hack that took more than 100 million accounts, 
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a 500-million-account hack of Yahoo, 340 million AdultFriendFinder accounts (their second hack 
in a year) and numerous other breaches.  Both frequency and scale of breaches have grown 
dramatically in the past five years.   
Auditors have argued forcefully that they have no explicit responsibility for detecting fraud and 
external threats during audits.  Nonetheless audits were forced to embrace some responsibility for 
detecting fraud and threats after the Enron and WorldCom collapses.  (AICPA 2002) provides 
specific guidelines with respect to the auditor’s responsibility for identifying external threats and 
fraud that may result in material misstatements.  Security breaches and other external threats to the 
firm are subsumed under the category of “fraud” which AU 316.05 clarified.    
“ a broad legal concept and auditors do not make legal determinations of 
whether fraud has occurred. Rather, the auditor's interest specifically relates to 
acts that result in a material misstatement of the financial statements. The 
primary factor that distinguishes fraud from error is whether the underlying 
action that results in the misstatement of the financial statements is intentional or 
unintentional. Fraud is an intentional act that results in a material misstatement 
in financial statements that are the subject of an audit." 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a formal attempt to impose additional joint responsibility on auditors 
and management for the detection of fraud and external threats, and for this research, SOX sections 
302 and 404 which require internal control assessments.   
SOX compliance has been contentious.  Questions have been raised concerning the effectiveness of 
expensive SOX reviews, the external validity of SOX assessments for security breaches, errors, 
fraud and other external financial threats to the firm, and usefulness of SOX reporting to investors 
and other stakeholders.  Unfortunately, these questions have been difficult to study, as external 
breaches, frauds and other crimes are significantly underreported in business, leading to a reporting 
bias in datasets that creates difficulties in controlled studies. Corporate executives, politicians and 
lobbyists have argued that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 is a cumbersome and costly 
regulation that is not effective (Drawbaugh 2012).  Compliance with just section 404 has been 
estimated to average $1.7 million per firm annually (FEI 2007) and   arguments have even been 
made before the US Supreme Court that SOX is unconstitutional (FEP 2010).   Publications on 
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market and economy wide effects of SOX implementation have opined with case studies and 
polemics as well as empirical studies (Bratton 2003, Romano 2004, Coates 2007, Engel, Hayes et 
al. 2007, Kang, Liu et al. 2010) but the evidence on whether SOX implementation has improved 
security and integrity of internal controls is still equivocal.   
This research addresses the question “How effective is corporate investment in SOX compliance in 
identifying and eliminating the threat from internal control security breaches?”   External validity 
and utility of SOX assessments are difficult to measure because of the inclination for firms, 
conscious of their reputation, to significantly underreport internal control breaches after they 
happen.   Effective breaches are seldom detected by the victim, and clearly cybercriminals 
themselves do not systematically report their activities.  Nonetheless we believe that SOX metrics 
provide information on the potential for information systems security breaches since that is a 
fundamental objective of effective internal control over computer systems, and we attempt to 
provide empirical validation of these beliefs in this research.   
Our current research investigates the information content of SOX reports with respect to security 
breaches to test five related hypotheses.   !": SOX 404 attestations add new information to management’s self-reported SOX 302 
attestations 
Importance: SOX 404 attestations are costly and controversial, with some critics questioning 
whether they add information not already available in SOX 302 attestations. !#: SOX 404 attests to the same set of system controls as SOX 302 attestations.    
Importance:  Hypothesis !# complements hypothesis !" and tests whether SOX 302 and SOX 404 
attestations relate to the same sets of controls and security issues.  !$: SOX 404 and 302 attestations contain information about the future occurrence of specific 
types of security breaches. 
Importance:  This is our main hypothesis and tests will determine how much information SOX 
provides with respect to the various breach types. 
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!&:	  Structural models improve the accuracy of SOX 302 and SOX 404 attestations with 
respect to security breaches; they add information by positing an underlying breach 
generation model that fits empirically.   
Importance: Lucas’ critique (Lucas 1976) suggested that structural models are needed to fully 
understand conclusions from regression analysis.   We construct two models: (1) a hazard structural 
model and (2) an occupancy structural model to provide specific policy recommendations for 
internal control.   !(:	 Underlying control weaknesses cited in SOX attestations cause higher rates of security 
breaches, and not vice versa (counterfactuals) 
Importance: we provide a counterfactuals test to determine the direction of causality, and assure 
that SOX attestations are not simply citing control weaknesses after the fact because security 
breaches have occurred.  Our	investigation	proceeds	as	follows.		Section	2	summarizes	prior	research	that	has	investigated	SOX	reporting	while	characterizing	SOX	reporting	following	its	full	implementation	in	2005.			Section	3	reviews	the	data	obtained	for	this	research.			Section	4	tests	H"	and	H#;	section	5	tests	H$;	section	6	tests	H&;	and	section	7	tests	H(.				Section	8	summarizes	these	results	with	policy	recommendations	and	recommendations	for	research	which	may	extend	the	findings	in	this	paper.			 	
2. Prior Research on Information in SOX attestations   
Most SOX studies to date have focused on internal consistency, compliance and accrual accounting 
assessments, rather than management of external risks such as fraud and security breaches.  There 
should be a high correlation between accountants’ assessment of control and their associated real-
world consequences, but a variety of obstacles make external validity very difficult to study.   Prior 
research has shown SOX 302 and SOX 404 metrics to be internally consistent within the 
bookkeeping and accounting domains.  SOX 404 exceptions have been found to be correlated with 
financial restatements after discovery of real-world operational discrepancies and there is weak but 
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positive support for SOX 404 assessments being consistent with good internal control (Rice and 
Weber 2012, Rice, Weber et al. 2014).  
Compliance cost and information content of SOX filings with respect to other financial statistics 
reported by companies have been studied almost since the inception of SOX.   (Rice and Weber 
2012, Rice, Weber et al. 2014) studied SOX 404 reporting for a sample of restating firms whose 
original misstatements are linked to underlying control weaknesses. They found that restatements, 
i.e. altering a prior year’s financial statements due to auditor stakeholder or legal pressure, provided 
a great deal of information about control weaknesses that could lead to security breaches and 
management’s awareness of these weaknesses.  In general, restating firms did acknowledge their 
existing control weaknesses during their misstatement periods and the probability of reporting 
existing weaknesses is negatively associated with external capital needs firm size non-audit fees 
and the presence of a large audit firm.  Restatements are positively correlated with financial 
distress, auditor effort, previously reported control weaknesses, other restatements and recent 
auditor or management changes.  (Rice and Weber 2012, Rice, Weber et al. 2014) found no 
evidence that penalties are more likely for firm managers or auditors that fail to report existing 
control weaknesses; rather they concluded that class action lawsuits management turnover and 
auditor turnover are all more likely in the wake of a restatement when control weaknesses had 
previously been reported.  They concluded that existing public and private enforcement 
mechanisms surrounding SOX 404 are unlikely to provide strong incentives for compliance and 
offer a potential explanation for why most restatements are issued by firms that previously claimed 
to have effective internal controls.  
 (Bedard, Hoitash et al. 2009, Bedard and Graham 2011) examined detection and severity 
classification of internal control deficiencies, finding that external auditors during their Section 404 
audit detect about three-fourths of unremediated internal control deficiencies.  (Ge, Koester et al. 
2016) looked at a sample of 261 companies that disclosed at least one material weakness in internal 
control in their SOX filings, finding that poor internal control is usually related to an insufficient 
commitment of resources for accounting controls, with the most common account-specific material 
weaknesses occurring in accounts receivable and inventory.  SOX 302 disclosures, in contrast, 
tended to describe internal control problems in complex accounts such as the derivative and income 
tax accounts. They found that disclosing a material weakness is positively associated with business 
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complexity (e.g. multiple segments and foreign currency), negatively associated with firm size (e.g. 
market capitalization) and negatively associated with firm profitability (e.g. return on assets).  (Lin, 
Pizzini et al. 2011) investigated the role that a firm’s internal audit function plays in the disclosure 
of material weaknesses reported under SOX 404 using data from 214 firms.  They found that 
material weakness disclosures are negatively correlated with the education level of the internal 
auditors and positively correlated with the practice of grading audit engagements and external-
internal auditor coordination. (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins et al. 2007) reported that SOX disclosed 
internal control deficiencies were associated with more complex operations, recent organizational 
changes, greater accounting risk, more auditor resignations and have fewer resources available for 
internal control.  They also found that firms with SOX disclosed internal control deficiencies had 
more prior SEC enforcement actions and financial restatements, were more likely to use a single 
dominant audit firm, and had more concentrated institutional ownership.  (Feng, Li et al. 2009) 
found that internal control deficiencies were correlated with less accurate guidance.  In particular, 
the impact of ineffective internal controls on forecast accuracy was found to be three times larger 
when the weakness related to revenues or cost of goods sold because of the importance of these 
two accounts in forecasting earnings.   (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins et al. 2008) found that firms 
reporting internal control deficiencies have lower quality accruals as measured by accrual noise and 
absolute abnormal accruals when compared to firms not reporting internal control problems.  
Additionally, firms whose auditors confirm remediation of previously reported internal control 
deficiencies exhibit an increase in accrual quality relative to firms that do not remediate their 
control problems. They found that material weaknesses are correlated with noise to accrual ‘noise’ 
(higher error term variance) and intentional misstatements that bias earnings upward.  
 
3. Breach and SOX Data Items 
SOX reporting began in 2004 but only in 2005 did all publicly traded companies report their SOX 
assessments.  This research collected SOX annual reports as well as publicly reported security 
breaches in the 10-year period 2005-2015.  We considered two overlapping groups of firms in our 
study: (1) publicly traded firms that reported SOX assessments and (2) publicly traded firms that 
had reported security breaches in the research period.  Figure 2 depicts the overlapping sets of: (A) 
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all US firms, (B) publicly traded US firms, and (C) public and private US firms that have reported 
security breaches.  We ignored management-only SOX assessments which primarily apply to small 
private firms and focused our research on the more complete dataset of publicly traded companies 
that includes external audit assessments of controls (+ in figure 2).    
 
 
Figure 1: Four subsets of firms for which data was obtained in this research 
We defined two additional subsets + ∩ - (public firms that experienced a breach) and + ∩ ¬- 
(public firms that did not experience a breach) where we proceeded with separate customized 
analyses to control selection bias.  To build the data subsets + ∩ - and + ∩ ¬- it was necessary to 
join the information on SOX and Breach reporting on a [0123 − 	5678] index.  The data is not 
directly comparable between these two subsets since SOX reports are periodic filings by 
management and auditors that are conditioned on managerial contracting processes not internal 
control processes.  In contrast the Breach dataset provides reports on the breakdown of internal 
control processes and are incomplete because companies and criminals do not like to report 
breaches; industry estimates suggest that between 3% and 30% of breaches are publicly reported 
(Menn 2012).  SOX reports will be generated annually whether anything occurs or changes with 
respect to internal control; but breaches clearly require some sort of control failure.  Table 1 
summarizes the data items extracted from the SOX 302 and 404 reporting that were used in the 
analysis. 
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Table 1: SOX 302 and 404 Metrics used in the Analysis 
SOX 302 metrics: 
IS_EFFECTIVE (302) Self-reported management assertion concerning 
whether internal controls are effective in the 
firm.  
0 = no  
1= yes 
MATERIAL_WEAKNESS (302) Self-reported management assertion concerning 
whether there exist material weaknesses in 
internal control systems in the company.    
0 = controls are effective 
1 = there are material weaknesses in the firm's controls 
SIG_DEFICIENCY (302) Self-reported management assertion concerning 
whether there exist significant deficiencies in 
internal control systems in the company 
0 = controls are effective 
1 = there are deficiencies in the firm's controls 
  
SOX 404 metrics: 
IC_OP_TYPE Manual system or Automated computer system   0 = Manual 
1 = Automated 
AUDITOR_AGREES (404) Auditors ‘attestation’ concerning management's 
SOX 404 assertions  
0 = disagree 
1 = agrees  
COMBINED_IC_OP (404) Combined opinion on the effectiveness of the 
firm’s internal controls 
0 = controls are generally effective 
1 = there exists a significant control deficiency 
IC_IS_EFFECTIVE (404) Management asserts that internal controls are 
effective (Internal Control is Effective) 
0 = no 
1 = yes 
 
AUDIT_FEE Cost of SOX 404 audit (numeric; monetary) 
 
This research collected 170647 annual SOX 302 and SOX 404 SEC 10-K 10-KSB 10-Q 10-QSB 
20-F and 40-F filings of U.S. firms publicly listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ (Firms began to 
report this data starting April 15 2005 but advanced filings appeared as early as 2002).   Out of 
these we selected the annual reporting only since these had the audited SOX information (Section 
404) as well as a comparable set of management reported SOX information (Section 302). We also 
acquired the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse / Verizon compilation of 388 major reported U.S. 
corporate security breaches since 2005 of which 213 applied to 184 NYSE and NASDAQ firms.   
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Table 2:  Breach Data used in the analysis 
 
SOX Reports:  Count 
• NASDAQ firms 1835 
• NYSE firms 1563 
Total Firms 3398 
• SOX Reports on Automated Systems 27496 
• SOX Reports on Manual Systems 31441 
Total SOX reports in NASDAQ & NYSE (dataset B) 58937   
Breach Data:  
• Payment Card Fraud (CARD) - Fraud involving debit and credit cards that is not 
accomplished via hacking. For example skimming devices at point-of-service 
terminals 
12 
• Unintended disclosure (DISC) - Sensitive information posted publicly on a website 
mishandled or sent to the wrong party via email fax or mail.  
70 
• Hacking or malware (HACK) - Electronic entry by an outside party malware and 
spyware.  
106 
• Insider (INSD) - Someone with legitimate access intentionally breaches 
information - such as an employee or contractor.  
51 
• Physical loss (PHYS) - Lost discarded or stolen non-electronic records such as 
paper documents  
20 
• Portable device (PORT) - Lost discarded or stolen laptop PDA smartphone 
portable memory device CD hard drive data tape and so forth.  
103 
• Stationary device (STAT) - Lost discarded or stolen stationary electronic device 
such as a computer or server not designed for mobility.  
11 
• Unknown (UNKN)  15 
• Total number of breaches reported from 2005 to 2016 (dataset C) 388 
Total number of breaches applicable to NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms (dataset + ∩ -) 213 
Unique firms in breach dataset listed on NYSE & NASDAQ 184 
  
 
Industry sources suggest that security breaches are substantially underreported by factors ranging 
from 3 to 30 (Menn 2012, Symantic 2016).   Cybercrime is a low-risk high return vocation that 
(Lewis and Baker 2013) estimate annually costs the global economy between $375 to  $575 billion 
in losses.  Most breaches are not reported as they may signal to customers and investors a lack of 
internal control.  This is especially true with financial institutions such as banks and insurance 
companies, who can avoid some of the public scrutiny of customer facing retail and Internet firms.  
In addition, the best hackers are often state-sponsored security professionals, using methods that 
are undetectable by current technologies and can subvert internal controls and compromise assets 
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without ever being detected.  Breaches, fraud, compromised computer systems as well as SOX 
compliance concerns have motivated billions of dollars of expenditure on computers and 
information systems upgrades and replacements.  
SOX statistics show that the adverse percentage rate for auditor attestations decreased rapidly from 
a high in 2004 of 16.9% to 10.3% in 2005 and by 2009 had leveled off at around 2% indicating 
either (1) management and internal staff were increasingly adept at convincing external auditors 
that their systems were secure and protected against fraud and external threats; or (2) there was a 
significant improvement in internal control immediately after implementation of SOX, at least in 
those areas that were included in the SOX audits.  There were additional “management-only” 
assessments primarily apply to small private firms; although trends for these firms roughly 
followed those of larger firms, the rate of issuance of adverse opinions typically was around 30% 
higher than for publicly traded companies (Cheffers 2012) and the percentage of adverse opinions 
has declined in tandem with those of publicly traded firms.     
In addition, each of the “Big 4” audit firms (which audit almost all of the listed firms on US 
exchanges) displayed unique biases in rendering adverse attestations: Ernst & Young focused on 
accounts receivables, revenue recognition, taxes and fixed assets; PricewaterhouseCoopers focused 
on accounts receivables, revenue recognition, taxes and payables; KPMG focused on accounts 
receivables, revenue recognition, taxes and inventory; and Deloitte & Touche focused on revenue 
recognition, taxes, liabilities, inventory and executive compensation (Cheffers 2012).  These biases 
are likely to reflect signature audit methods, internal forms and checklists, and audit histories that 
are unique to individual firms.  These firms will consequently allocate larger portions of the audit 
budget to certain accounts at the expense of others.  Additionally, auditors tend to allocate more 
time to auditing debit balance accounts, assuming double entry will assure the accuracy of the 
credit accounts; but the accounts selected for audit depend on firm policy, procedures and 
managing partners.  
Information systems security vulnerabilities are addressed in auditors’ assertions of whether 
specific “material weaknesses” have been found.  These vary from year to year as old weaknesses 
are addressed and new weaknesses surface, but eight financial reporting areas that were cited as 
poorly controlled in an adverse SOX Opinion:  (1) Accounts/Loans Receivable (2) Investments or 
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Cash; (3) Securities (Debt Quasi-Debt Warrants and Equities); Revenue Recognition; (4) Tax 
Expense/Benefit/Deferral (FAS109); (5) Liabilities Payables Reserves and Accrual Estimates; (6) 
Entity (Foreign Related Party Affiliated Subsidiary); (7) PPE Intangibles Fixed Assets; and (8) 
Inventory Vendor Cost of Sales.  Only (1), (2) and (8) tend to be control areas that will show up in 
reported security breaches.  Additionally eight operational areas commonly appeared in SOX 404 
attestations:  (1) response to prior SOX 404 opinions; (2) response to material weakness; (3) 
personnel issues; (4) segregation of duties; (5) restatements of financials; (6) material year-end 
adjustments; (7) internal audit findings; and (8) IT Systems. Only (3), (4) and (8) tend to be 
operational areas that will show up in reported security breaches, although (Rice and Weber 2012, 
Rice, Weber et al. 2014) found that (5), the restatement of financials, was a significant indicator of 
internal control weaknesses that would lead to adverse SOX 302 and 404 assessments and potential 
security weaknesses. 
The basic “unit” of observation in this analysis is the publication of a SOX report and breaches are 
interpreted as ex post evidence concerning information in these SOX reports.  Whether ex post 
means correlation or causality will be explored in our test of H: counterfactuals.  The breach 
information is both censored (it has only been collected between 2005 and 2015) and it is 
incomplete as only 3% to 30% of breaches are publicly reported on this dataset  (Menn 2012).   
This is a significant problem in inference as it suggests that the observed (reported) breaches are a 
subset of the population.   In randomized samples 3-30% would be sufficient for inference; and 
field studies commonly appeal to the concept of a “convenience sample.” We judged it likely to 
find some systematic biases in both occurrence and reporting of breaches with consumer facing 
industries more likely to report (because it is difficult to hide a breach from customers) and back 
office financial industries less likely to report due to the impact on their reputation for security and 
efficiency.   We address these potential biases in the structural models presented later in the paper 
but initially construct Breach-SOX panel data for regression incorporating available data.    
In order to merge the two datasets we organized them into observations indexed on {0123	158<710182} + {5678} .  Neither the set of firms nor the dates correspond in the two 
datasets.  SOX reporting dates occur annually for publicly listed firms and it is sufficient simply to 
index them by year.   Breach reports though appear in a press release or news article whose date 
has daily resolution and can include both listed and unlisted firms.   We have expanded the breach 
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event period to on year, since our dataset includes only a report date, and the breach itself often 
spanned a period, usually not longer than one year.  With these generalizations, it is possible to 
merge the breach and SOX data indexed on {0123	158<710182} + {?862} .      
The dataset reports breaches for 213 of the 3398 listed firms which report SOX assessments 
between 2005 and 2015. Restriction of the analysis to subsets + ∩ - in figure 2 (public firms that 
experienced a breach) resolves the issue with firms by dropping the breached firms for which we  
have no SOX 404 reports and a conceptual model for the panel regression (A286Bℎ8D	~	FGH)J∩K   
where A286Bℎ8D represent security breach classifications and other metrics from the Privacy 
Clearinghouse / Verizon dataset and FGH represents SOX 302 and 404 reported assessments from  
the AuditAnalytics dataset.   Datasets were dichotomized into manual and automated systems each 
which receives separate SOX reports.  
 
4. Tests of SOX Information Content  
The rapid initial decline in the SOX adverse percentage rate for auditor attestations from an initial 
16.9% to a current level of around 2% suggests that SOX 404 audit procedures, which are 
estimated to cost around $2 million annually, are not adding significant information about systems 
security over that provided by management in internal auditors at the firm in their self-reported 
SOX 302 attestations.  To investigate, we tested !": SOX 404 attestations add new information to 
management’s self-reported SOX 302 attestations.  This will test the veracity of critiques that SOX 
404 attestations are costly without providing new information not already available in SOX 302 
attestations.  
We concluded that any confounding SOX attestations effects due to firm size were insignificant 
with respect to the research questions investigated here.  This was not unexpected as neither (Ge, 
Koester et al. 2016) nor (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins et al. 2007) discovered size effects in SOX 404 
disclosures, though they did find that firm complexity did contribute to the number of adverse 
attestations under section 404.  To assess the possibility of size effects confounding our main tests 
about information in SOX attestations about security breaches, four measures of firm size – sales, 
net income, market capitalization, and number of employees – were regressed against 
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Table 3 summarizes the results: the four L#s are around 1-5% and the only significant relationship 
we found was that firms with more employees have more “insider” breaches (INSD) which seems a 
logical consequence of a larger more labor-intensive operations.  Other financial metrics are only 
weakly correlated with all types of security breaches.  An insignificant amount of variance in 
breach occurrences depends on structural parameters and fit statistics 7 − D7671D71BD, L#’s and N −D7671D71BD indicate that firm size is an insignificant influence on the rate of occurrence of security 
breaches.  
Table 3: OLS Regression of Breach Type Occurrence against Firm Size and Operations Metrics 
 
Capitalization 
 
Sales 
  
Income 
  
Number of employees 
 
y ® Estimate t Sig Estimate t Sig Estimate t Sig Estimate t Sig 
x ¯ 36555 4.655 *** 29591 6.244 *** 2664.76 3.279 *** 74.164 6.029 *** 
CARD 5973 0.591 
 
7754 1.167   396.35 0.348   20.796 1.214 
 
DISC -10479 -1.228 
 
11702 2.194 *  -72.33 -
0.079 
  26.028 1.891 . 
HACK -14291 -1.697 . -11826 -
2.205 
*  -1432.22 -
1.557 
  -11.49 -0.83 
 
INSD -6047 -0.698 
 
13329 2.377 *  -661.13 -
0.688 
  64.556 4.474 *** 
PHYS -6043 -0.576 
 
4949 0.714   -913.76 -
0.769 
  -6.953 -0.39   
PORT 13050 1.582 
 
12670 2.475 *  162.26 0.185 * 32.534 2.459 * 
STAT -22686 -2.298 * 7116 1.045   -2604.27 -2.23   -8.22 -0.473   
UNKN NA NA   NA NA   NA NA   NA NA   L# 0.05429   0.04479   0.01104   0.04741   
F 10.43 
  
10.74 
  
2.556 
  
11.28 
  
             
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
     
 
We tested panel data of annual firm reports (subset B in figure 2) from 2005 through 2015 
separately for audits of manual and automated system with conceptual model1 (FGH404	~	FGH302)J which was implemented in the following regression model: 
                                               
 
1 For conceptual discussions, I have throughout this paper used the R-language format of “response variable  
predictor variables” where the tilde means “is modeled as a function of."   The parentheses and subscript further 
define the population in which the model is tested. 
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SOX404VW = 	YZ +	Y"SOX302VW + Y#SOX302[\ + Y$SOX302]^ ++Y&SOX302_`abc + Y(SOX302d_ + Y:SOX302efg + YhSOX302ijkfcja + YlSOX302mcnjo			 (1) 
Where:  
Variable Description FGH404qK  Internal Controls are Effective Indicator Variable FGH302qK  Internal Controls are Effective Indicator Variable FGH302rs  Material Weaknesses Exist Indicator Variable FGH302tu Significant Deficiencies Exist Indicator Variable FGH302vwxyz  Audit Firm Audit Fees FGH302{v Non-Audit Firm Fees FGH302|}~  Audit Firm Tax Fees FGH302ÄÅ}zÄx Audit Firm Related Fees FGH302ÇzÉÄÑ  Audit Firm Other Fees 
 
Wooldridge's test for unobserved individual effects yielded z = 2.535 (p-value = 0.01124) for the 
automated systems audits; and for manual systems z = 3.7439 (p-value = 0.0001812) both 
supporting a hypothesis that unobserved effects exist, indicating we need to use fixed effects 
regression. Wooldridge's test for serial correlation in fixed effects panels yielded Ö#= 0.24677 (p-
value = 0.6194) and for manual systems Ö#= 4.1434 (p-value = 0.0418) both suggesting that serial 
correlation exists in the panels.  Unobserved effects and serial correlation would be expected if we 
consider a structural analysis of auditing.   Audit scope is limited by regulation, so it would be 
expected that there are unobserved effects that are not covered by this regulation.  Firms that have 
poor security in one year, are likely to have poor security in other years, and thus the indicators and 
fees will both exhibit serial correlation.  Tables 4 and 5 summarize the panel regression results. 
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Table 4:  Fixed Effects Panel Regression estimates for SOX 404 "Internal Controls are Effective in the Firm’s Automated Systems" 
Decisions (dependent) on SOX 302 and Management Decisions (independent) 
 
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
 
IS_EFFECTIVE 0.155 0.004 40.606 0.000 *** 
MATERIAL_WEAKNESS -0.810 0.004 -198.815 0.000 *** 
SIG_DEFICIENCY -0.009 0.001 -7.047 0.000 *** 
AUDIT_FEES -1.41E-10 9.60E-11 -1.4715 0.1412  
NON_AUDIT_FEES 2.77E-08 2.95E-08 0.9396 0.3474  
TAX_FEES -2.70E-08 2.95E-08 -0.9164 0.3595  
AUDIT_RELATED_FEES -2.76E-08 2.95E-08 -0.9367 0.3489  L# 0.90782     
F-statistic 29507.7  
   
Residual Plot 
 
 
In the reports of both manual and automated systems, the estimators indicate that firms on average 
attest that internal controls are effective six times Ü6 ≅ 1 0.155ã ≅ 1 0.175ã ç as often in SOX 302 
reports as in SOX 404 reports.   The signs for all the variables are in the expected direction and 
there was no evidence that any of the fees charged to the firm influenced the auditor’s opinion – we 
validated the independence of SOX auditors.   In both manual and automated systems, the firm’s 
self-reported “material weaknesses” were associated with around 80% of SOX 404 negative 
control assessments, while self-reported “significant deficiencies” appeared in only around 1-2% of 
SOX 404 negative control assessments.  This suggests that management’s self-reported “material 
weaknesses” were a significant indicator of control problems identified by auditors, while 
significant deficiencies were not.  
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Table 5:  Fixed Effects Panel Regression estimates for SOX 404 "Internal Controls are Effective in the Firm’s Manual Systems" 
Decisions (dependent) on SOX 302 and Management Decisions (independent) 
 
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
 
IS_EFFECTIVE 0.175 0.004 40.080 0.000 *** 
MATERIAL_WEAKNESS -0.796 0.005 -173.302 0.000 *** 
SIG_DEFICIENCY -0.016 0.002 -10.241 0.000 *** 
AUDIT_FEES 1.33E-10 1.26E-10 1.0608 0.2888  
NON_AUDIT_FEES 5.37E-08 3.86E-08 1.3911 0.1642  
TAX_FEES -5.28E-08 3.86E-08 -1.3681 0.1713  
AUDIT_RELATED_FEES -5.39E-08 3.86E-08 -1.3973 0.1623  L# 0.86641     
F-statistic 22251.6 
    
Residual Plot 
 
 
The correlation between an auditors’ SOX404 attestation in a year is strongly (99.99% confidence) 
dependent on SOX302VW , SOX302tu and SOX302_`abc and slightly less so for SOX302[\. The 
amounts of variance explained in the automated and manual systems data subsets are L# = 91% 
and L# = 87% respectively, which lends credence to the parameter estimates.   Our findings 
strongly support the hypothesis !# that SOX 404 testing adds new information to self-reported 
SOX 302 attestations, and suggest that SOX 404 audits, though influenced by management’s self-
reported “material weaknesses,” are additionally providing investors with information not 
otherwise available to stakeholders.  
Serial correlation in the panel data was detected via Wooldridge's test, and we have taken 
advantage of this finding by removing this effect in testing !$	by summing (aggregating) all the 
data by firm.   Any contemporaneous agreement by auditors and management should be washed 
out in the aggregation over time.  Any remaining questions concerning auditors’ independence in 
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the conduct of SOX 404 tests could possibly have arisen because underlying control weaknesses 
are obvious, and do not necessarily require independent attestation to identify.  Appearances of 
control weaknesses are expected to be transient and time dependent, i.e., management is strongly 
inclined to rectify them once they are discovered, and thus the same weaknesses should not be 
present in subsequent time periods.  If we test the previous model with data that has been 
aggregated over the time periods from 2005 to 2015, we will smooth any transient effects and 
reveal sustained biases and lack of independence in SOX 404 attestations.   To this end we tested !#: SOX 404 attests to controls over the same systems as management and internal auditors SOX 
302 attestations, to determine if the convergence of opinions of auditors and management are due 
the same set of underlying control weaknesses that exist at a point in time.   
Because we chose a fixed effects model for the panel regressions, we have chosen to retain the 
intercept in the regressions of the aggregated data to absorb any unobserved effects, making the 
results between the two regressions comparable.  The results presented in tables 6 and 7 and 
estimators have changed substantially because of regression to the mean.     
Table 6: Regression estimates for SOX 404 "Internal Controls are Effective in the Firm’s Automated Systems" Decisions 
(dependent) on SOX 302 and Management Decisions (independent) aggregated over years 2005 to 2015 
 
 
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 0.381700 0.038310 9.964000 0.000000 *** 
IS_EFFECTIVE 1.970000 0.003912 503.603000 0.000000 *** 
MATERIAL_WEAKNESS 0.893900 0.016250 55.011000 0.000000 *** 
SIG_DEFICIENCY -0.037210 0.010710 -3.474000 0.000521 *** 
AUDIT_FEES 0.000001 0.000000 3.252000 0.001157 ** 
NON_AUDIT_FEES 0.000404 0.000141 2.869000 0.004143 ** 
TAX_FEES -0.000401 0.000141 -2.848000 0.004427 ** 
AUDIT_RELATED_FEES -0.000407 0.000141 -2.892000 0.003853 ** 
OTHER_FEES -0.000403 0.000141 -2.866000 0.004192 ** L# 0.9906     
F-statistic 38700   
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Table 7: Regression estimates for SOX 404 "Internal Controls are Effective in the Firm’s Manual Systems" Decisions (dependent) 
on SOX 302 and Management Decisions (independent) aggregated over years 2005 to 2015 
 
In the reports of both manual and automated systems, the estimators indicate that firms on average 
attest that internal controls are effective one-third to one-half  ë0.3	7í	0.5 ≅ 	1 2.96ã 	7í	 1 1.97ã ì as 
often in SOX 302 reports as in SOX 404 reports.  Overall, firms seem to be substantially more 
vigilant and suspicious of internal control weaknesses than SOX 404 auditors.  It is likely that 
management and internal auditors have more information about control weaknesses, since they 
audit the firm year-round, as opposed to the annual engagements of SOX404 teams. The amounts 
of variance explained in the automated and manual systems data subsets are both L# ≅ 99% and 
this improvement probably reflects the regression to the mean because of aggregation.  The impact 
of “significant deficiency” assertions in SOX 302 appear consistent with the panel regressions.   
Magnitude changes on the SOX 302 “control is effective” and “material weakness” estimators as 
well as the sign reversals “material weakness” estimates lead us to reject !$.  The sign reversal 
from panel regression results of the “material weakness” estimates suggests that the absence of 
“material weaknesses” self-reported by management in the SOX 302 reports was associated with 
significantly higher incidence of negative SOX 404 control assessments in general.  This is 
consistent with prior research by (Benoit 2006, Bedard, Hoitash et al. 2009) who found that 
management is overconfident in assessing internal control effectiveness reflected in self-reporting 
under SOX302 where 90% of companies with ineffective Section 404 controls 
 
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 0.611400 0.060790 10.059000 0.000000 *** 
IS_EFFECTIVE 2.956000 0.006189 477.640000 0.000000 *** 
MATERIAL_WEAKNESS 1.763000 0.022310 79.031000 0.000000 *** 
SIG_DEFICIENCY -0.052900 0.016950 -3.120000 0.001822 ** 
AUDIT_FEES 0.000002 0.000001 3.641000 0.000276 *** 
NON_AUDIT_FEES 0.000590 0.000235 2.513000 0.012017 * 
TAX_FEES -0.000585 0.000235 -2.495000 0.012660 * 
AUDIT_RELATED_FEES -0.000595 0.000235 -2.536000 0.011243 * 
OTHER_FEES -0.000590 0.000235 -2.515000 0.011947 * L# 0.988     
F-statistic 34480.00 
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(IC_IS_EFFECTIVE  = 0) still self-reported effective 302 controls (IS_EFFECTIVE=1) in the 
same period end that an adverse Section 404 was reported.   We confirmed Benoit’s findings: in 
our data Welch’s Two Sample t-statistic was −0.24999		(î − ï6ñ: 0.8026).	 This may reflect that 
management is generally unaware of material weaknesses that the SOX 404 external auditors deem 
important, and that auditors “educate” management about the material weaknesses during the 
conduct of their SOX 404 attestations.  We concluded that rather than both management and 
auditors discovering the same underlying internal control situation at any time; instead the SOX 
404 auditors were likely to discover material weaknesses and “educate” management and internal 
audit teams about the importance of these control weaknesses.  
 
5. Predicting Breaches  
Our tests to this point have shown that the occurrence of breaches is only weakly affected by size, 
and that the strength of internal controls is likely to be a significant factor in the occurrence of a 
breach at a firm in a period.  We also concluded that SOX 404 auditors maintain their 
independence consistent with Generally Accepted Auditing Standard (GAAS).  With the 
investigation of potentially confounding factors of size and auditor independence effectively 
completed, we can move on to testing our main hypothesis !$:	 SOX 404 and 302 attestations 
contain information about the future occurrence of specific types of security breaches. 
We tested panel data of annual firm reports (intersection + ∩ - in figure 2) from 2005 through 
2015 separately for audits of manual and automated system with conceptual model (A286Bℎ8D	~	FGH)J∩K	which was implemented in the following regression model: 	A286Bℎ = 	YZ +	Y"SOX302VW + Y#SOX302[\ + Y$SOX302]^ ++Y&SOX404VW + +Y(SOX302_`abc + Y:SOX302d_ + YhSOX302efg ++	YlSOX302ijkfcja + YóSOX302mcnjo		 (2) 				
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Estimators 
  
Woolridge Individual 
Effects Test 
Woolridge Serial Correlation 
Test  
SOX 404 
Effective 
Control 
SOX 302 
Effective 
Control 
SOX 302 Mtl 
Weakness 
SOX 302 Sig 
Deficiency 
Audit Fees Other Fees !" F z p-value #" p-value 
Payment Card Fraud 
(CARD) 
-0.9953 0.9913 0.0071 -0.0238 0.0000 0.0020 0.1681 1.8182 -0.9029 0.3666 4.3 0.0376 
(t-value) -2.8160 2.5910 0.0515 -0.4932 -0.5547 0.1638   
     
(p-value) 0.0061 0.0113 0.9591 0.6232 0.5807 0.8703   
     
Unintended 
disclosure (DISC)   
0.1417 0.0452 0.4832 -0.1052 0.0000 0.0046 0.2411 2.8594 1.6187 0.1055 11.8 0.0006 
(t-value) 0.1788 0.0527 1.5623 -0.9711 -0.3400 0.1676   
     
(p-value) 0.8585 0.9581 0.1221 0.3344 0.7347 0.8673 
      
Hacking or malware 
(HACK) .  
0.4715 -0.4426 -0.3179 0.0541 0.0000 -0.0042 0.0400 0.3752 1.4735 0.1406 4.8 4.7971 
(t-value) 0.5630 -0.4883 -0.9724 0.4728 0.2287 -0.1441   
     
(p-value) 0.5750 0.6267 0.3337 0.6376 0.8197 0.8858 
      
 Insider (INSD).  -0.3209 0.5343 -0.1124 0.1895 0.0000 -0.0214 0.2234 2.5882 1.9584 0.0502 11.0 0.0009 
(t-value) -0.4339 0.6674 -0.3893 1.8743 -1.4343 -0.8355   
     
(p-value) 0.6656 0.5064 0.6981 0.0645 0.1554 0.4059 
      
Physical loss (PHYS)  0.1981 0.0660 0.3679 0.0528 0.0000 0.0461 0.3592 5.0440 0.6085 0.5428 130.3 0.0000 
(t-value) 0.3718 0.1144 1.7681 0.7249 0.0191 2.4913   
     
(p-value) 0.7110 0.9092 0.0808 0.4706 0.9848 0.0148 
      
Portable device 
(PORT)  
0.8772 -0.6878 0.4239 -0.1119 0.0000 -0.0235 0.1739 1.8943 0.5024 0.6154 3.0 0.0851 
(t-value) 0.8690 -0.6294 1.0755 -0.8104 1.6993 -0.6716   
     
(p-value) 0.3874 0.5309 0.2853 0.4201 0.0931 0.5037 
      
Stationary device 
(STAT)   
0.0480 -0.0590 -0.0150 0.0011 0.0000 0.0002 0.0015 0.0135 1.4913 0.1359 828280.0 0.0000 
(t-value) 0.1807 -0.2053 -0.1443 0.0304 0.3264 0.0223   
     
(p-value) 0.8571 0.8379 0.8856 0.9759 0.7450 0.9823 
      
 Unknown (UNKN)  -0.4204 0.5526 0.1633 -0.0567 0.0000 -0.0037 0.0398 0.3728 0.5464 0.5848 10.1 0.0015 
(t-value) -0.7616 0.9249 0.7579 -0.7518 -0.8653 -0.1952   
     
(p-value) 0.4485 0.3578 0.4507 0.4544 0.3894 0.8457 
      
Table 8:  Manual Systems Main Results 
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Estimators 
  
Woolridge Individual Effects 
Test 
Woolridge Serial 
Correlation Test  
SOX 404 
Effective 
Control 
SOX 302 
Effective 
Control 
SOX 302 Mtl 
Weakness 
SOX 302 Sig 
Deficiency 
Audit Fees Other Fees !" F z p-value #" p-value 
Payment Card 
Fraud (CARD) 
-0.9931 0.9877 0.0060 -0.0239 0.0000 0.0023 0.1681 1.7736 -0.8886 0.3742 4.3 0.0372 
(t-value) -2.7572 2.5254 0.0425 -0.4881 -0.5314 0.2008   
     
(p-value) 0.0072 0.0136 0.9662 0.6268 0.5966 0.8414   
     
 Unintended 
disclosure (DISC)   
0.2688 -0.1400 0.4254 -0.0975 0.0000 0.0132 0.2340 2.6815 1.6445 0.1001 10.8 0.0010 
(t-value) 0.3378 -0.1620 1.3655 -0.9024 -0.0587 0.5287   
     
(p-value) 0.7364 0.8717 0.1760 0.3696 0.9534 0.5985 
      
Hacking or 
malware (HACK)  
0.3213 -0.2443 -0.2500 0.0541 0.0000 -0.0016 0.0461 0.4238 1.4766 0.1398 4.1 0.0436 
(t-value) 0.3839 -0.2688 -0.7627 0.4764 -0.0167 -0.0626   
     
(p-value) 0.7020 0.7888 0.4479 0.6351 0.9867 0.9502 
      
 Insider (INSD).  -0.3278 0.5372 -0.1096 0.1916 0.0000 -0.0176 0.2255 2.5551 1.9611 0.0499 10.5 0.0012 
(t-value) -0.4380 0.6610 -0.3741 1.8846 -1.4045 -0.7520   
     
(p-value) 0.6626 0.5105 0.7093 0.0632 0.1641 0.4543 
      
Physical loss 
(PHYS)  
0.1639 0.1037 0.3838 0.0578 0.0000 0.0517 0.3588 4.9115 0.5475 0.5840 124.3 0.0000 
(t-value) 0.3017 0.1758 1.8044 0.7839 -0.0238 3.0376   
     
(p-value) 0.7636 0.8609 0.0750 0.4355 0.9811 0.0032 
      
Portable device 
(PORT)  
0.9591 -0.7614 0.3866 -0.1293 0.0000 -0.0468 0.2031 2.2365 0.6680 0.5042 2.5 0.1118 
(t-value) 0.9388 -0.6863 0.9665 -0.9319 1.6864 -1.4618   
     
(p-value) 0.3507 0.4945 0.3368 0.3542 0.0957 0.1478 
      
Stationary device 
(STAT)   
0.0497 -0.0612 -0.0158 0.0009 0.0000 0.0001 0.0015 0.0135 1.4697 0.1416 780210.0 0.0000 
(t-value) 0.1838 -0.2083 -0.1491 0.0250 0.3263 0.0080   
     
(p-value) 0.8546 0.8355 0.8819 0.9801 0.7451 0.9936 
      
 Unknown 
(UNKN)  
-0.4420 0.5782 0.1736 -0.0538 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0403 0.3690 0.5449 0.5859 10.1 0.0015 
(t-value) -0.7860 0.9469 0.7884 -0.7046 -0.8802 -0.0652   
     
(p-value) 0.4342 0.3466 0.4328 0.4831 0.3814 0.9482 
      
Table 9:  Automated Systems Main Results 
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We tested a panel binomial models (logit and probit) using a General Linear Model approach, but 
achieved better fit using standard linear model panel regression.  The reason that a binomial model 
may be preferred is to avoid estimator bias with smaller sample sizes, but in our research of ("#$%&ℎ$(	~	+,-)/∩1  the data sets are sufficiently large that there is no advantage to using probit 
or logit models, and linear model panel regression approaches will yield unbiased estimators.  The 
appropriateness of the fixed effects linear model was tested using Hausman test, Chamberlain test 
for fixed effects, and Wooldridge’s test for unobserved effects in panel models (Wooldridge 2010, 
Shang and Wooldridge 2016, Wooldridge 2016).   We computed Wooldridge's test statistics for 
models with each type of breach dependent indicator variable.  Test statistics for all the models 
indicate there are possible unobserved individual effects and thus we used fixed effects panel 
regression. 
 
Figure 2: Relative Effectiveness of SOX Assessments in Controlling Types of Security Breaches in Automated Systems 
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Wooldridge's test for serial correlation in fixed effects statistics also suggested significant serial 
correlation in all the models, which seems reasonable given that security breaches often happen 
long before they are detected, and indeed may go uncorrected for some time after being detected.  
Note that an assessment of good internal control (SOX 302 and 404) is represented by an indicator 
value of “1”.   Assessments of material weaknesses and significant deficiencies are also represented 
by an indicator value of “1”, but imply the contrary assessment that control is not adequate.   Thus, 
in establishing the vertical axes in figures 2 and 3, the latter two estimators were multiplied by −1.		  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Relative Effectiveness of SOX Assessments in Controlling Types of Security Breaches in Manual Systems 
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Figures 2 and 3 displays the relative effectiveness of SOX assessments in controlling various types 
of security breaches in automated and manual systems respectively.  Looking more closely at these 
effects, we can see that SOX auditing has significantly varying effectiveness in predicting the 
various classes of security breach, but the results were very similar for manual and automated 
systems.   The model fit (56) was nearly zero for hacking and malware (HACK), stationary devices 
(STAT) and situations where the cause of the breach was unknown (UNKN), suggesting that 
current SOX audit practice both inside and outside of the firm provide little information useful in 
controlling these threats.  The estimators for unintended disclosures (DISC) and physical losses 
(PHYS) were small, which also suggests that SOX audits provide little information useful for 
controlling these types of breaches.  Where SOX provided significant predictive power in 
identifying future security breaches, management’s (SOX 302) assessments were generally much 
less informative than those provided by SOX 404 audits.  This concurs with what we discovered in 
our previous tests that did not include the breach information, and is consistent with prior research 
by (Benoit 2006, Bedard, Hoitash et al. 2009) who found that management is overconfident in 
assessing internal control effectiveness reflected in self-reporting under SOX302.   SOX 404 
adverse decisions on effectiveness of controls occurred in 100% of credit card (CARD) data 
breaches and around 33% of insider (INSD) breaches.  But SOX 404 audits gave “effective” 
control decisions on 88% of situations where there was a control breach concerning a portable 
(PORT) device.  This suggests that employees are subverting strict internal controls by using 
portable devices that can be carried outside the physical boundaries of the firm, and which can be 
used more freely than devices that are directly under the firm’s control.  Furthermore, the SOX 
auditors are not catching these subversions to internal control.  
 
6. Structural Models  
The panel regression results reported above provide useful insights into idiosyncrasies of SOX 
auditing and its effectiveness with respect to specific types of security breaches.  Our 56	fit 
statistics ranged from under 1% up to 36%, depending on the amount of information we have about 
specific types of breaches (breaches that are more common provided more data, and thus better 
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model fit).  These research datasets arose through natural experiments with biases that were 
discussed earlier, and we did not have the luxury of randomization as we would expect from 
laboratory studies.   To see if we could improve on these fits, we imposed additional structure on 
our research models in a quest to infer the underlying processes generating the data and to 
potentially control potential biases arising from observational data. (Lucas 1976) argued that 
generic additive linear models such as those invoked in our previous section panel regressions lack 
stability and robustness.   Empirical models are improved when constructs are policy-invariant i.e. 
structural i.e. not they would necessarily change whenever the competitive environment or policy 
was changed.   (Lucas 1976) promoted a positive research program for how to do dynamic 
quantitative economics arguing that real-world decisions will diverge from the relationships 
observed in historical data.  Policy-invariant structural models need to be constructed through 
analysis of the underlying dynamics of the construct relationships and behavior.  
Invoking a theoretical model for the underlying security risks faced by firms solves two problems 
in our subsequent analysis: 1. Breach	data	is	sparse	so	panel	regression	algorithms	are	more	likely	to	terminate	without	a	solution	due	to	singular	matrices	or	failure	of	the	algorithm	to	converge.		A	theoretical	distribution	allows	effective	bootstrapping	to	resolve	computation	problems.	2. Breach	data	is	significantly	underreported	and	a	theoretical	model	allows	development	of	theoretically	sound	extrapolations	to	better	estimate	the	true	risk	to	firms	of	security	breaches.		
In this section, we developed structural models that aggregated panels and used empirical 
distributions of rate of breach occurrence using two alternative underlying generation models. This 
reduced our merged dataset to a dataset of individual firm “observations” that link breach 
occurrence timing distributions to SOX assessment timing distributions.  The two structural models 
were a hazard model (time to breach / failure) and an occupancy model (breaches assigned to firm  
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a) Hazard Structural Model of Breaches 
We constructed the breach hazard dataset by reorganizing the full breach report dates (month-day-
year) into intervals of days between a breach.  The data was left-censored at January 1 2005 and 
right-censored at December 31 2016.   A similar sort of structured model would not make sense on 
for the SOX dataset since SOX reports appear at regular annual intervals so instead the full SOX 
dataset and empirical “expected time to breach” parameter estimates for the analysis of our 
regression model ($789#9&%:	;9(<#9"=<9>?	>@	<97$	<>	?$A<	"#$%&ℎ~	+,-)/∩1 .  We additionally had 
data on type of breach (e.g. a Hack, Inside Job etc.) but this was sparse making it problematic to 
make broader inferences in this way at any resolution less that the general reporting of breach.    
We computed the times in days between breaches and fit a left-right censored (by these dates) 
dataset to a potential “time to next breach” distribution.  Three distributions are commonly 
considered in this sort of failure analysis:  1. Exponential	which	assumes	that	breaches	are	independent	of	each	other	2. Gamma	offers	a	very	general	distribution	that	includes	both	exponential	and	Gaussian	distributions	as	well	as	other	candidates	and	3. Gaussian	offers	a	convenient	distribution	for	additive	processes	with	very	well	developed	statistical	algorithms.	
Following our original assumption that hackers are agnostic that they do not favor breaching one 
firm over another and assuming they act independently of each other they do not tell many people 
about their illegal breaches we initially favored a working hypothesis that breach occurrences were 
distributed exponentially.   Our maximum likelihood fit of “expected time to next breach” 
observations though strongly rejected the exponential distribution.  This seems to imply that 
breaches are not stochastically independent events which makes sense if we consider an alternative 
hypothesis that hackers may cost-effectively attack many firms at once using the same exploits 
resulting in many successful hacks that are not stochastically independent of each other.  
The Gamma distribution (which includes both exponential and Normal distributions as subclasses) 
in contrast provided a good fit giving very high values to the shape and scale parameters.  As shape 
and scale increase the Gamma distribution converges to a Gaussian distribution and our empirical 
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fit strongly supports expected time between breaches being Gaussian distributed.  The mean time 
(in days) between breaches was estimated by fitting2 the censored breach data (in the period 2005 
through 2015) to a Gaussian distribution with mean and variance statistics computed for each listed 
firm and year for which SOX reports were generated.  
Where a company had no breaches in the censored time interval we used a conservative estimate of 
a Gaussian distribution of time to next breach with mean	 = 	standard	deviation	 = 	3651 	;%Q(	in the interval January 1 2005 to December 31 2014 reflecting a less than a 50% chance of a 
breach in this period. 
 
Table 10: Regression results from the Hazard Model of Breaches 
  
(Intercep
t) 
302:   
Effective 
Control 
302: 
Material 
Weakness 
302:Signif 
Deficiency 
404: 
Effective 
Control 
56 
Time (days) to 
Next Breach of 
Automated 
Systems 
Estimate 2047.774 -58.689 -1.634 18.657 -175.264 0.66% 
Std. Error 149.608 112.124 151.709 36.502 119.805 
 
t-val 13.688 -0.523 -0.011 0.511 -1.463 
 
Time (days) to 
Next Breach of 
Manual Systems 
Estimate 2047.778 -59.231 -1.602 19.364 -175.444 0.67% 
Std. Error 149.608 112.126 151.71 36.512 119.805 
 
t-val 13.688 -0.528 -0.011 0.53 -1.464 
 
 
Table 10 summarizes the ($789#9&%:	;9(<#9"=<9>?	>@	<97$	<>	?$A<	"#$%&ℎ~	+,-)/∩1  
regression using a hazard model that assumes a Gaussian distribution.  Unfortunately, there is 
insufficient data on the individual types of breaches to fit hazard models, so we need to be content 
with estimation of the undifferentiated breach total.  But 56 is around 2 3S  for both manual and 
automated systems, which strongly supports the modeled relationships.  Furthermore, we argue that 
the information provided from estimation of the hazard structural model is complementary to our 
                                               
 
2 Empirical fit was accomplished using the fitdistcens algorithm in the fitdistrplus package in R which 
computes maximum likelihood estimations of the distribution parameters using the Nelder-Mead method. 
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other tests, as it estimates the change in expected time between breaches given management’s or 
auditors’ SOX attestation, and the results are consistent whether addressing manual or automated 
systems. 
Table 11: Change in Breach Frequency based on Hazard Model 
 
Change in 
Number of Days 
between Breaches 
% Change Conclusion 
Expected days between 
breaches when SOX302  
and SOX404 indicators = 0  
2048 100.00% Baseline 
SOX302:   Effective Control 
=1 
+59 +2.88% Less Frequent Breaches when Control is 
Effective 
SOX302: Material 
Weakness =1 
+1.6 +0.08% No Effect 
SOX302:Signif Deficiency 
=1 
-19 -0.93% Slightly More Frequent Breaches with 
Significant Deficiencies 
SOX404: Effective Control 
=1 
+175 +8.54% Less Frequent Breaches when Control is 
Effective 
 
Table 11 provides policy recommendations and where management knows the expected cost of a 
breach, a specific value which may be matched to the cost of the SOX404 and SOX302 
attestations.  For example, if we assumed that the breach in question was a Home Depot or Target 
sized breach of say around $100 million occurring every 2048 days (5.6 years), then a 175 day 
increase represents an average $8.5 million annual savings by conducting the SOX404 audit.   The 
hazard structural model is highly suggestive, but additional data at the level of specific type of 
breach will be needed before this model can be explored further.   
 
b) Occupancy Structural Model of Breaches 
Our regression of ($789#9&%:	#%?T − @#$U=$?&Q	;9(<#9"=<9>?	>@	"#$%&ℎ$(	~	+,-)/  was 
extrapolated to the full set of firms V using a Bose-Einstein occupancy model. Applications of 
Bose-Einstein statistics in economics, psychology and finance have grown substantially over the 
past decade, e.g., in (Kürten and Kusmartsev 2011, Xu 2015) (Pascual-Leone 1970, Bouchaud and 
Mézard 2000, Weiss and Weiss 2003, Mezard and Montanari 2009) and (Amati and Van 
Rijsbergen 2002).  They have been shown to provide accurate models of economic networks like 
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the financial reporting and Internet hacker networks investigated here.  They are effective in 
modeling competitive, non-equilibrium systems and can predict first-mover-advantage, Matthew 
Effects and winner-takes-all phenomena observed in competitive systems as phases of the 
underlying evolving networks (Bianconi and Barabási 2001).   
Bose-Einstein model construction in this section proceeds as follows.  Let there be W listed 
companies on the NYSE+NASDAQ exchanges with XY security breaches in the W companies’ 
systems and ZY wealth (dollars) that could be extracted from a breach of the systems of the 9[\ 
company within an interval of time.  This can be defined as an “occupancy” problem of a form 
extensively studied in physics where three main systems are defined: Fermi-Dirac Maxwell–
Boltzmann and Bose-Einstein occupancy.  Fermi-Dirac occupancy implies that a company’s 
systems cannot be hacked or breached twice (i.e. lightening doesn’t strike twice) in some time 
interval which is clearly not realistic.  Maxwell–Boltzmann occupancy is a theoretical concept at 
the core of the Gibbs Paradox and does not make sense in the current research context.  Bose-
Einstein occupancy in contrast is found in many real-world phenomena and is a basic assumption 
that we make in this analysis of corporate security breaches.  Bose-Einstein occupancy implies that 
those who commit security breaches are agnostic – they don’t care what firm they hack; they are 
attracted instead by any chance for gain, havoc or other hacking goal.   
Let ZY be large XY random and make the very weak assumption of convergence to a limiting 
distribution ]^_^ → a(A)~bAc	%(	A → 0	e > 0.  (Hill 1974) building on earlier work from (Simon 
1955, Mandelbrot 1960, Mandelbrot 1965) and (Hill 1970) showed that if the rank-frequency 
distribution of number of security breaches g(h) to the systems of the #[\  company follows a Bose-
Einstein allocation of ZY wealth (dollars) extracted from the company through XY hacking attempts 
then g(h) ∝ #j(klm) for 1 + o = kc.    This is called a Zipf distribution, and has mass function (and 
thus frequency) @klm(#) = #j(klm) p(#)q   where p(#)	is Reimann’s zeta and o ∈ [0,∞].  In our 
dataset W = 3398	NYSE+NASDAQ listed firms and of the 388 breaches in the data ∑ 	XY∀Y =213	occurred in 184 of the NYSE+NASDAQ listed firms (V ∩ b) in the time interval from 2005 to 
2015.   
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Table 12:  Estimates of o for frequencies @klm(#) ∝ #j(klm)    
 
CARD DISC HACK INSD PHYS PORT STAT UNKN {(<97%<$	>@	o 2.0008 3.9656 4.4153 3.5513 2.4404 4.3913 1.9381 2.1775 5$|#$((9>?	{(<97%<># -1.0008 -2.9656 -3.4153 -2.5513 -1.4404 -3.3913 -0.9381 -1.1775 +<;. {##># 0.0664 0.1084 0.1271 0.0990 0.0778 0.1255 0.0645 0.0713 < − }%:=$ -15.0800 -27.3500 -26.8600 -25.7640 -18.5200 -27.0200 -14.5500 -16.5040 56 37.06% 65.96% 65.15% 63.23% 47.06% 65.41% 35.43% 41.37% a − (<%< 227 748 722 664 343 730 212 272 {	(;%Q(	"$<~$$?	"#$%&ℎ) #9|ℎ< − <%9:	>?:Q 13,203 4,773 2,289 6,919 11,825 2,434 13,366 12,697 
 
Table 12 shows the results of fitting our breach dataset to the occupancy model.  All regressions 
were significant at the .0001 significance level, despite three limitations in our data: 1. Industry	sources	suggest	that	security	breaches	are	substantially	underreported	by		factors	ranging	from	3	to	30	(Menn	2012,	Symantic	2016).				2. Breach	counts	are	integer	and	thus	the	estimated	continuous	curve	is	an	approximation.	3. All	but	184	(4.6%)	of	the	3398	listed	firms	reported	zero	breaches	in	the	research	period;	these	clearly	represent	the	range	where	g(h) < 1	since	breach	counts	are	integers.	
The absence of reported breaches in the right tail of our rank-frequency ordering does not imply 
that these firms face no threat from security breaches.  Rather breach probabilities in the right tail 
reflect a pervasive low level background threat facing all firms equally (since firms with no 
breaches cannot be ranked) and these should be treated similarly to so-called 5000 year errors 
(Adams 1980) in software testing.  From our perspective, the firms in the right tail are unranked 
and identical and thus face a uniform background probability of breach that is very low but not 
zero.  
The empirical coefficient o has various explanations in the literature depending on whose model 
you are using; for example (Mandelbrot 1960, Mandelbrot 1965) contends that these represent a 
sort of systems entropy and can be modeled using fractals.  It is beyond the scope of this research 
to further embellish such narratives and we simply assume that the value of o	describes some 
artifact or metric of industry wide security.  
	
 
33	
Zipfian rank-frequency distributions are fat-tailed; their probability density function is proportional 
to #jÄ → 0 for large r and the cumulative tail distribution does not converge.  In our case the tail is 
right-bounded at # = 3398.    The breach probability for a single firm in the right tail is ∑ #j(klÅ)ÇÇÉÑhÖkÑÜ∑ #j(klÅ)ÇÇÉÑhÖk  
and the mean days between breaches will be 
∑ há(àâä)ããåçéèà ×	kë	íìÄhî	×	ÇïÜ.6ÜñÄíî íìÄhS∑ há(àâä)ããåçéèàçó   
 
The mean time to failure ranges from 6 to 36 years for individual breach types, and over 5 months 
for all types combined.  This is somewhat more frequent than the 5.6 years expected between 
breaches by the hazard structural model, but with more extensive data collection, a more robust 
estimate could be obtained, and we consider this estimate to be realistic for the occupancy 
structural model.  Such failures where they do occur in the software field are apocryphally called 
5000 errors and have been studied in (Boehm, Clark et al. 1995, Westland 2000, Westland 2002, 
Westland 2004) .  
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Table 13:Occupancy Structural Model for Automated Systems 
 
SOX 302 SOX 404 Fees 
 
Estimators IC Effective Mat Weakness Sig Defic IC Effective Audi Non-Audit Tax Related Other !"		$%&	' − )*$* 
CARD  8.66E-14 9.52E-14 -1.41E-14 -4.14E-14 1.21E-19 -2.09E-17 1.95E-17 2.19E-17 2.05E-17 0.001653 
s.e. 8.84E-14 5.62E-14 2.59E-14 4.41E-14 8.21E-19 3.42E-16 3.42E-16 3.42E-16 3.42E-16 0.5402 
t-value 0.979 1.693 -0.544 -0.938 0.148 -0.061 0.057 0.064 0.06 
 
p-value 0.3276 0.0905 0.5862 0.3482 0.8825 0.9513 0.9546 0.9491 0.9522 
 
DISC 2.18E-20 2.46E-20 -3.46E-21 -1.05E-20 3.15E-26 -3.92E-24 3.53E-24 4.18E-24 3.82E-24 0.001601 
s.e. 2.21E-20 1.41E-20 6.49E-21 1.10E-20 2.06E-25 8.58E-23 8.58E-23 8.57E-23 8.58E-23 0.5234 
t-value 0.983 1.744 -0.533 -0.951 0.153 -0.046 0.041 0.049 0.044 
 
p-value 0.3258 0.0812 0.5943 0.3415 0.8784 0.9636 0.9672 0.9611 0.9645 
 
HACK 6.53E-22 7.39E-22 -1.04E-22 -3.15E-22 9.59E-28 -1.15E-25 1.03E-25 1.23E-25 1.12E-25 0.001599 
s.e. 6.65E-22 4.23E-22 1.95E-22 3.31E-22 6.17E-27 2.57E-24 2.58E-24 2.57E-24 2.57E-24 0.5225 
t-value 0.982 1.747 -0.531 -0.951 0.155 -0.045 0.04 0.048 0.043 
 
p-value 0.3261 0.0807 0.5952 0.3415 0.8765 0.9645 0.9681 0.962 0.9654 
 
INSD 5.47E-19 6.15E-19 -8.70E-20 -2.64E-19 7.75E-25 -1.02E-22 9.19E-23 1.08E-22 9.89E-23 0.001605 
s.e. 5.56E-19 3.54E-19 1.63E-19 2.77E-19 5.16E-24 2.15E-21 2.15E-21 2.15E-21 2.15E-21 0.5245 
t-value 0.984 1.74 -0.534 -0.951 0.15 -0.047 0.043 0.05 0.046 
 
p-value 0.3254 0.0819 0.5933 0.3416 0.8806 0.9624 0.966 0.96 0.9634 
 
PHYS 2.96E-15 3.29E-15 -4.77E-16 -1.42E-15 4.02E-21 -6.42E-19 5.92E-19 6.76E-19 6.27E-19 0.001627 
s.e. 3.01E-15 1.92E-15 8.83E-16 1.50E-15 2.80E-20 1.17E-17 1.17E-17 1.17E-17 1.17E-17 0.532 
t-value 0.983 1.715 -0.541 -0.946 0.144 -0.055 0.051 0.058 0.054 
 
p-value 0.3255 0.0864 0.5889 0.3442 0.8858 0.9561 0.9595 0.9538 0.9571 
 
PORT 7.87E-22 8.91E-22 -1.25E-22 -3.80E-22 1.16E-27 -1.39E-25 1.24E-25 1.48E-25 1.35E-25 0.001599 
s.e. 8.02E-22 5.10E-22 2.35E-22 4.00E-22 7.44E-27 3.11E-24 3.11E-24 3.10E-24 3.10E-24 0.5226 
t-value 0.982 1.747 -0.531 -0.951 0.155 -0.045 0.04 0.048 0.043 
 
p-value 0.3261 0.0807 0.5951 0.3415 0.8766 0.9644 0.9681 0.962 0.9654 
 
STAT 1.40E-13 1.54E-13 -2.28E-14 -6.67E-14 1.98E-19 -3.44E-17 3.21E-17 3.59E-17 3.38E-17 
 
s.e. 1.43E-13 9.09E-14 4.19E-14 7.13E-14 1.33E-18 5.54E-16 5.54E-16 5.54E-16 5.54E-16 0.001658 
t-value 0.978 1.689 -0.545 -0.936 0.149 -0.062 0.058 0.065 0.061 0.542 
p-value 0.3281 0.0913 0.5858 0.3491 0.8813 0.9504 0.9537 0.9482 0.9514 
 
UNKN 2.24E-14 2.47E-14 -3.62E-15 -1.07E-14 3.07E-20 -5.15E-18 4.78E-18 5.39E-18 5.04E-18 0.00164 
s.e. 2.28E-14 1.45E-14 6.67E-15 1.14E-14 2.12E-19 8.82E-17 8.82E-17 8.82E-17 8.82E-17 0.5362 
t-value 0.981 1.703 -0.543 -0.942 0.145 -0.058 0.054 0.061 0.057 
 
p-value 0.3264 0.0886 0.5874 0.3462 0.8848 0.9535 0.9568 0.9512 0.9545 
 
Total Breach 2.52E-13 2.77E-13 -4.10E-14 -1.20E-13 3.54E-19 -6.11E-17 5.70E-17 6.39E-17 5.99E-17 0.001654 
s.e. 2.57E-13 1.64E-13 7.53E-14 1.28E-13 2.39E-18 9.96E-16 9.96E-16 9.96E-16 9.96E-16 0.5407 
t-value 0.979 1.692 -0.545 -0.938 0.148 -0.061 0.057 0.064 0.06 
 
p-value 0.3277 0.0907 0.5861 0.3485 0.8821 0.9511 0.9544 0.9489 0.952 
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Table 14:Occupancy Structural Model for Manual Systems 
 
SOX 302 SOX 404 Fees 
 
Estimators IC Effective Mat Weakness Sig Defic IC Effective Audit Non-Audit Tax Related Other !"		$%&	' − )*$* 
CARD  8.25E-14 8.47E-14 -1.05E-14 -2.63E-14 2.06E-19 -1.77E-17 1.62E-17 1.84E-17 1.66E-17 0.001414 
s.e. 7.00E-14 5.15E-14 2.31E-14 2.32E-14 7.65E-19 3.20E-16 3.20E-16 3.20E-16 3.20E-16 0.5272 
t-value 1.178 1.644 -0.456 -1.133 0.269 -0.055 0.051 0.058 0.052 
 
p-value 0.239 0.1 0.649 0.257 0.788 0.956 0.96 0.954 0.959 
 
DISC 2.06E-20 2.17E-20 -2.56E-21 -6.63E-21 5.19E-26 -3.28E-24 2.89E-24 3.50E-24 3.00E-24 0.001357 
s.e. 1.75E-20 1.29E-20 5.78E-21 5.81E-21 1.92E-25 8.02E-23 8.02E-23 8.02E-23 8.02E-23 0.5059 
t-value 1.176 1.683 -0.443 -1.141 0.271 -0.041 0.036 0.044 0.037 
 
p-value 0.2396 0.0925 0.6578 0.254 0.7867 0.9674 0.9712 0.9652 0.9702 
 
HACK 6.18E-22 6.52E-22 -7.67E-23 -1.99E-22 1.57E-27 -9.60E-26 8.42E-26 1.03E-25 8.74E-26 0.001354 
s.e. 5.26E-22 3.87E-22 1.74E-22 1.75E-22 5.75E-27 2.41E-24 2.41E-24 2.41E-24 2.41E-24 0.5048 
t-value 1.175 1.685 -0.442 -1.141 0.273 -0.04 0.035 0.043 0.036 
 
p-value 0.2401 0.0921 0.6587 0.2541 0.785 0.9682 0.9721 0.966 0.9711 
 
INSD 5.18E-19 5.44E-19 -6.45E-20 -1.67E-19 1.29E-24 -8.52E-23 7.55E-23 9.06E-23 7.79E-23 0.001361 
s.e. 4.40E-19 3.24E-19 1.45E-19 1.46E-19 4.81E-24 2.01E-21 2.01E-21 2.01E-21 2.01E-21 0.5075 
t-value 1.177 1.68 -0.445 -1.141 0.268 -0.042 0.037 0.045 0.039 
 
p-value 0.2391 0.0931 0.6566 0.2539 0.7886 0.9663 0.9701 0.9641 0.9691 
 
PHYS 2.82E-15 2.92E-15 -3.55E-16 -9.01E-16 6.87E-21 -5.41E-19 4.91E-19 5.69E-19 5.03E-19 0.001387 
s.e. 2.39E-15 1.76E-15 7.87E-16 7.91E-16 2.61E-20 1.09E-17 1.09E-17 1.09E-17 1.09E-17 0.5172 
t-value 1.18 1.661 -0.451 -1.139 0.263 -0.05 0.045 0.052 0.046 
 
p-value 0.238 0.0968 0.6518 0.2549 0.7922 0.9605 0.9641 0.9584 0.9633 
 
PORT 7.46E-22 7.87E-22 -9.25E-23 -2.40E-22 1.89E-27 -1.16E-25 1.02E-25 1.24E-25 1.06E-25 0.001354 
s.e. 6.35E-22 4.67E-22 2.09E-22 2.11E-22 6.94E-27 2.91E-24 2.91E-24 2.90E-24 2.91E-24 0.5048 
t-value 1.175 1.685 -0.442 -1.141 0.273 -0.04 0.035 0.043 0.036 
 
p-value 0.2401 0.0921 0.6586 0.2541 0.7851 0.9682 0.9721 0.966 0.971 
 
STAT 1.33E-13 1.37E-13 -1.70E-14 -4.25E-14 3.36E-19 -2.91E-17 2.68E-17 3.03E-17 2.75E-17 0.00142 
s.e. 1.13E-13 8.33E-14 3.73E-14 3.75E-14 1.24E-18 5.18E-16 5.18E-16 5.18E-16 5.18E-16 0.5293 
t-value 1.178 1.64 -0.456 -1.132 0.271 -0.056 0.052 0.058 0.053   
p-value 0.239 0.101 0.648 0.258 0.786 0.955 0.959 0.953 0.958 
 
UNKN 2.13E-14 2.19E-14 -2.70E-15 -6.79E-15 5.24E-20 -4.34E-18 3.97E-18 4.55E-18 4.07E-18 0.001401 
s.e. 1.80E-14 1.33E-14 5.95E-15 5.98E-15 1.97E-19 8.25E-17 8.25E-17 8.25E-17 8.25E-17 0.5224 
t-value 1.179 1.652 -0.454 -1.136 0.266 -0.053 0.048 0.055 0.049 
 
p-value 0.2383 0.0987 0.6501 0.2561 0.7906 0.9581 0.9616 0.9561 0.9607 
 
Total Breach 2.40E-13 2.46E-13 -3.06E-14 -7.65E-14 6.01E-19 -5.16E-17 4.75E-17 5.38E-17 4.86E-17 0.001416 
s.e. 2.04E-13 1.50E-13 6.72E-14 6.75E-14 2.23E-18 9.32E-16 9.32E-16 9.32E-16 9.32E-16 0.5278 
t-value 1.178 1.643 -0.456 -1.132 0.27 -0.055 0.051 0.058 0.052 
 
p-value 0.239 0.1 0.649 0.258 0.787 0.956 0.959 0.954 0.958 
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The probability of a breach at any given time is small, with a large enough population of firms one 
can expect many failures to show up every year across the full population of firms and industry 
wide risk of breach is thus substantial.   Even more so if you subscribe to the estimate that only 3-
30% of breaches are reported, and thus in our dataset.   
The !"		$%&	' − )*$*+)*+,) are only weakly significant or insignificant in all the regressions.    
The occupancy structural model does not contribute the hoped for new information on the 95.4% of 
the listed firms that did not publicly report breaches.   Occupancy structural models may be useful 
in future estimation of breach probabilities for the full set of listed and SOX attested firms, but we 
will need substantially information about breaches that occur to successfully use such models for 
inference. 
 
7. Causal Direction (counterfactuals) 
The prior section tested whether managerial and audit exceptions in the SOX 302 and 404 
attestations influence the probability of security breaches.   Support for -. and rejection of 	-" and -/	prove that adverse published opinions from SOX audits and lower audit fees are correlated with 
increased occurrence of security breaches.  Our working hypothesis has been that the extensiveness 
of the audit opinion provides detailed guides to changes in a firm’s internal control systems that 
will lower their probability of incurring a security breach in the future.  To validate this causal 
chain: $&012)1	$3&+*	45+%+4%)	 → +75240171%*)	+%	89	 → :4;12	2+)<	4=	>21$,ℎ 
To validate this we construct the counterfactual hypothesis to be tested (disproved):   -@:  There will be higher cumulative abnormal SOX metrics in years following a security 
breach that indicate that the security breach has motivated auditors and management to 
render adverse opinions on the firm’s internal controls.  
To establish ‘occurrence’ causality we tested the counterfactual	{BCD|>21$,ℎ	4,,321%,1}  i.e. 
whether the occurrence of a security breaches affect SOX 302 and 404 metrics using the Welch 
Two Sample t-test (table 3).  To establish ‘temporal’ causality we tested the counterfactual {BCD|>21$,ℎ	&$*1} on the subset of 213 breaches in the largest registered firms following the 
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(MacKinlay 1997) flow of analysis of event studies.   We had 213 breach “events” recorded for 
NYSE and NASDAQ companies G>HIJK	LK 	…	>HIJNKO	LNKOP at times {). … )"./} and companies with a 
subset of ticker symbols G*+,QK … *+,QNKOP ∈ {*+,. … *+,S}.  For each breach event >HIJTU	LU  we define 
two time period durations G&VWXYLU 	&VZLHYLUP For any particular SOX 302 or 404 metric (i.e. one of 
the columns in the dataset) we will have a market expectation (average) value for any SOX 
metric		[∀IH(^I_H)	and  abnormal return for firm + time * and metric 7 a!I_H∈bcdeUfg	 =^I_H∈bcdeUfg	 − 		[∀IH(^I_H) with 9a!I_bcdeUfg = ∑ a!I_H∀H∈bcdeUfg .   Security breach events were 
chosen from the period 2007 – 2014 which allowed two years on either side to include the full data 
series from our research dataset. 
Appraisal of the event's impact requires a measure of abnormal return.  The abnormal return is the 
actual ex post return of the asset over the event window minus the normal return of the asset over 
the event window.  We used a constant mean return model and the normal return is defined as the 
expected return conditioned on the event.   For firm + and event date * the abnormal return is a!IH = !IH − [(!IH|DH) (6) 
where a!IH !IH  and [(!IH|DH) are the abnormal actual and normal returns respectively for time 
period *.  DH is the conditioning information from the normal return model and a return is computed 
from the dataset values (designated here as k for consistency with event study notation). 
!IH = kIH − kIHY.kIHY. (7) 
In the current research our data is categorical kIH ∈ {01} and without loss of information we can set !IH ≅ kIH since all the kIH ∈ {01}.  The abnormal return analogue for such data is  a!IH = kIH − [∀IH(kIH) (8) 
The cumulative abnormal return is: 
9a!IVXWIZb =q a!IH∀H∈VXWIZb (9) 
where the 512+4& is either the pre- or post- event 2-year window.   
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Figure 4: Conceptual Schematic of Abnormal Return Calculations 
Since this research involves an annual time series the 120-day period typically used in stock price 
based event studies is too short.    Rather we will assume the pre- and post- event windows are two 
years wide; and we will assume that there is no conditioning window around the event itself (as 
may be the case in stock price event studies).   Security breach events were chosen from the period 
2007 – 2014 which allowed two years on either side to include the full data series from our 
research dataset.   
Table 15:  Occurrence Counterfactual:  Welch Two Sample t-test comparing firms with and without breach in the estimation period 
for key SOX metrics     
 
Welch t-stat Welch-
Satterthwaite 
DF 
p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
IS_EFFECTIVE -0.602 336.540 0.548 -0.026 0.014 
MATERIAL_WEAKNESS 1.056 336.720 0.292 -0.009 0.029 
SIG_DEFICIENCY -1.285 336.060 0.200 -0.053 0.011 
AUDITOR_AGREES -0.089 89.372 0.929 -0.099 0.090 
COMBINED_IC_OP -0.227 122.490 0.821 -0.069 0.055 
IC_IS_EFFECTIVE 0.308 366.450 0.758 -0.018 0.024 
AUDIT_FEES -6.400 122.060 0.000 -13851669 -7306656 
 
Table 16:  Temporal Counterfactual:  Welch Two Sample t-test of CAR before and after breach event for key SOX metrics     
 
Welch t-stat Welch-
Satterthwaite 
DF 
p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
IS_EFFECTIVE -0.720 230.683 0.212 -0.011 0.004 
MATERIAL_WEAKNESS 1.095 71.641 0.298 -0.003 0.029 
SIG_DEFICIENCY -0.101 652.146 0.328 -0.103 0.021 
AUDITOR_AGREES -0.007 113.927 1.247 -0.174 0.079 
COMBINED_IC_OP -0.129 190.568 0.110 -0.018 0.078 
IC_IS_EFFECTIVE 0.329 394.594 1.142 -0.019 0.038 
AUDIT_FEES -12.445 187.358 0.000 -13692930.748 -66609.057 
 
Tables 15 and 16 provide results of Welch Two Sample t-test’s, which is the most suitable test for 
comparisons of the averages of two independent groups, extracted from two populations where 
variance is unknown and the sample variances are not homogeneous.  Unfortunately, all the firm 
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and auditors’ SOX attestations p-values are quite high, and we are unable to differentiate the means 
of the two groups.  The direction of causality is equivocal in all cases except for those related to 
audit fees.   Figure 5 shows the consistency in the mean value of audit and non-audit fees charged 
to clients over time.  Audit fees (black) rose sharply from 2003 to about 2007 because of SOX 
compliance work, but dropped back down and dipped after the 2008 recession.  This created a 
situation where the cumulative average returns pre- and post-breach were different for the audit 
fees.  
 
Figure 5: Trends in Audit Fees (black) vs. Other Fees (grey) across firms in the dataset s ∩ 9 	
8. Conclusions and Discussion 
How effective is corporate investment in SOX compliance in identifying and eliminating the threat 
from breaches?   To that end we investigated in this paper breaches of corporate systems to 
determine whether SOX assessments are information bearing with respect to the firm’s 
vulnerability to and history of security breaches.   SOX focuses on a firm’s internal control and its 
potential to suffer systems intrusion from external actors, which can lead to materially significant 
losses and misstatements.      
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We investigated -. whether the costly and controversial SOX 404 attestation work of external 
auditors provided information not in management attestations, published in SOX 302 reporting. We 
found for reports of both manual and automated systems that firms on average attest that internal 
controls are effective six times as often in SOX 302 reports as in SOX 404 reports.   There was no 
evidence that any of the fees charged to the firm influenced the auditor’s opinion – we validated the 
independence of SOX auditors.   In both manual and automated systems, the firm’s self-reported 
“material weaknesses” were associated with around 80% of SOX 404 negative control assessments, 
while self-reported “significant deficiencies” appeared in only around 1-2% of SOX 404 negative 
control assessments.  This suggests that management’s self-reported “material weaknesses” were a 
significant indicator of control problems identified by auditors, while significant deficiencies were 
not.   Our findings strongly support the hypothesis -. that SOX 404 testing adds new information 
to self-reported SOX 302 attestations, and suggest that SOX 404 audits, though influenced by 
management’s self-reported “material weaknesses,” are additionally providing investors with 
information not otherwise available to stakeholders.  
Hypothesis -" tested whether external auditors in their SOX 404 procedures were investigating the 
same systems control weaknesses, and finding the same types of problems, as management and 
internal auditors in their SOX 302 procedures.  Complementing hypothesis -. we wanted to not 
only know whether external auditors were providing additional information, but also whether they 
were searching for the same set of control weaknesses as management’s SOX 302 attestations. In 
the reports of both manual and automated systems, the estimators indicate that firms on average 
attest that internal controls are effective one-third to one-half as often in SOX 302 reports as in 
SOX 404 reports.  Overall, firms seem to be substantially more vigilant and suspicious of internal 
control weaknesses than SOX 404 auditors.  It is likely that management and internal auditors have 
more information about control weaknesses, since they audit the firm year-round, as opposed to the 
annual engagements of SOX404 teams.  Magnitude changes on the SOX 302 “control is effective” 
and “material weakness” estimators as well as the sign reversals in “material weakness” estimates 
lead us to reject -".  The sign reversal from panel regression results of the “material weakness” 
estimates suggests that the absence of “material weaknesses” self-reported by management in the 
SOX 302 reports was associated with significantly higher incidence of negative SOX 404 control 
assessments in general.  This is consistent with prior research findings in (Benoit 2006, Bedard, 
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Hoitash et al. 2009) that management is overconfident in assessing internal control effectiveness 
reflected in self-reporting under SOX302 where 90% of companies with ineffective Section 404 
controls still self-reported effective 302 controls in the same period end that an adverse Section 404 
was reported.  We rejected -" and found that management and auditors do not general agree on the 
underlying internal control situation at any time; instead the SOX 404 team was likely to discover 
material weaknesses and “educate” management and internal audit teams about the importance of 
these control weaknesses.  
Our tests to this point have shown that the occurrence of breaches is only weakly affected by size, 
and that the strength of internal controls is likely to be a significant factor in the occurrence of a 
breach at a firm in a period.  We also concluded that SOX 404 auditors maintain their 
independence consistent with Generally Accepted Auditing Standard (GAAS).  With the 
investigation of potentially confounding factors of size and auditor independence effectively 
completed, we can move on to testing our main hypothesis H/.  We found that SOX 404 audits 
provided significantly more predictive power in identifying future security breaches than 
management’s (SOX 302) assessments which is consistent with prior research findings in (Benoit 
2006, Bedard, Hoitash et al. 2009, Rice and Weber 2012, Rice, Weber et al. 2014).   SOX 
attestations were poor at identifying control weaknesses that might lead to unintended disclosures 
(DISC), physical losses (PHYS), hacking and malware (HACK), stationary devices (STAT) and 
situations where the cause of the breach was unknown (UNKN), suggesting that current SOX audit 
practice both inside and outside of the firm provide little information useful in controlling these 
threats.  SOX 404 adverse decisions on effectiveness of controls occurred in 100% of credit card 
(CARD) data breaches and around 33% of insider (INSD) breaches.  But SOX 404 audits gave 
“effective” control decisions on 88% of situations where there was a control breach concerning a 
portable (PORT) device, suggesting that employees are subverting particularly strict internal 
controls by using portable devices that can be carried outside the physical boundaries of the firm, 
and which can be used more freely than devices that are directly under the firm’s control.  And 
furthermore, the SOX auditors are not catching these subversions to internal control.  
Hypothesis -@ tested whether structural models as recommended in Lucas’ critique (Lucas 1976) 
could extend our inferences from the relatively limited breach data by positing an underlying 
generation model.  We constructed two models: (1) a hazard structural model and (2) an occupancy 
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structural model.  The hazard model provided specific management policy recommendations, 
especially where management knows the expected cost of a breach.  We found an expected 2.88% 
reduction in breaches when SOX 302 controls are effective; management “material weakness’ 
attestations provided no information in this structural model, whereas there would be around a 1% 
increase in breach occurrence when there are significant deficiencies.  Finally, SOX 404 
attestations were the most informative, and a negative SOX 404 attestation is projected to increase 
the frequency of breaches by around 8.5%.  The hazard structural model is highly suggestive, but 
additional data at the level of specific type of breach will be needed before this model can be 
explored further.   The occupancy model was unfortunately less successful, though it had the more 
ambitious objective of providing predictions across all the listed firms.   The mean time to failure 
of the occupancy model was consistent with those from the hazard model, and we feel that with 
more extensive data collection, a more robust estimate could be obtained. We consider our 
estimates to be realistic but poorly supported by our current dataset for the occupancy structural 
model.  We believe that with more information about breaches, that these model holds promise for 
successful future structural modeling.  
Finally, our hypothesis -w tests of causality (counterfactuals) yielded equivocal results and we 
were unable determine the direction of causality.   The only effect we found was with respect to 
audit fees which rose sharply from 2003 to about 2007 because of SOX compliance work, but 
dropped back down and dipped after the 2008 recession; these effects were driven by factors 
external to our study.  This created a situation where the cumulative average returns pre- and post-
breach were different for the audit fees, but did not specifically indicate a causal relationship.  
This research provided insights into the value of SOX 404 and 302 attestations in managing the 
increasingly complex internal control environment that firms face.  SOX 404 procedures are costly 
and controversial, but we have provided evidence to show that even in the limited realm of security 
breaches (only a small part of SOX attestation work) external and internal SOX audits provide 
important information that is not otherwise available to the firms and regulatory organizations.  As 
with all empirical security research, ours is hampered by the fact that cybercrime is a low-risk high 
return vocation.  Industry estimates suggest that only 3% to 30% of breaches are publicly reported 
in our research dataset (Menn 2012) and often breaches are not reported by firms because they may 
signal to customers and investors a lack of internal control. the best hackers are likely to be state-
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sponsored security professionals, using methods that are undetectable by current technologies and 
which can subvert internal controls and compromise assets without ever being detected.   This is 
especially true with financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies, who can avoid 
some of the public scrutiny of customer facing retail and Internet firms.  With clever use of existing 
breach data for construction of structural models, and more powerful tests, we are confident that 
these limitations in empirical research on control breaches can be overcome.   
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